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Case No. 17359 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
PARK CITY RESERVATIONS, INC., dba SKYLINE REALTY, 
HARRY F. REED, AND GARY COLE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involves a dispute as to whether or not respondent 
Park City Reservations, Inc., a real estate office, is entitled to 
receive a portion of a real estate commission which relates to the 
sale of certain properties in Park City, or whether the entire real 
estate commission should go to appellant, another real estate office 
located in Park City. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a trial, Judge Sawaya of the Third District Court decided 
against appellant on all of the claims asserted against Park City 
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Reservations, Inc., Reed, and Cole (for purposes of this brief these 
appellees where appropriate will be collectively referred to as 
"PCR"). Th T . 1 C e ria ourt ruled in favor of Park City Reservations, 
Inc., on the counterclaim which was awarded sixty percent (60%) ofa 
real estate commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
PCR, Reed, and Cole, request that the Trial Court judgment be 
affirmed in all respects. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts set forth below do not encompass all of the factual 
assertions made by appellant. Many of the factual assertions made 
by appellant relate only to Unionamerica and not to these 
respondents. Therefore, these respondents set forth only the 
factual contentions which are relevant to claims by and against PCR. 
1. Appellant is a Utah corporation whose chief executive 
officer had a valid broker's license under the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
2. Unionamerica and its wholly owned subsidiary Ramshire were 
foreign corporations who did business within the State of Utah. For 
purposes of this brief these defendants will also treat Unionamerica 
and Ramshire as one and the same. 
3. PCR was a Utah corporation with its principal place of 
business in Summit County and whose shares were owned by Harry F. 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Reed. PCR, doing business as Skyline, was both a defendant and 
counterclaimant in the Trial Court. 
4. Harry Reed was a duly licensed real estate broker who was 
employed by Skyline Realty in Park City. At all times relevant to 
this action Skyline Realty was a branch brokerage of Skyline Real 
Estate located in Salt Lake City and as such was registered with the 
Utah Department of Business Regulations. Harry Reed was the 
registered broker/branch manager of Skyline Realty (Record on 
Appeal p. 773-Exhibit 43). Harry Reed established Skyline Realty 
some time in 1973. The exact date Skyline Realty was established as 
a sole proprietorship is not part of the record except insofar as it 
is included in an affidavit submitted from the Secretary of State's 
office which will be discussed in subsequent pages of this brief. 
Mr. Ladd Christensen was the real estate broker for Skyline Real 
Estate and Investment Company out of Salt Lake City. Although 
Skyline Realty was a branch brokerage for Skyline Real Estate and 
Investment Company, it was owned by Harry Reed. On December 11, 
1974, Harry Reed incorporated the branch brokerage and took as its 
name Park City Reservations, Inc., d/b/a Skyline Realty. Mr. Reed 
testified that it was his understanding that PCR was entitled to do 
business in the name of Skyline Realty. (T. 428.) PCR d/b/a Skyline 
Realty, continued to do business at all times relevant herein as a 
branch brokerage of Skyline Real Estate and Investment Company· 
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5. As set forth above, PCR does not agree that Ladd 
Christensen's company was a different company than PCR during the 
periods in question. PCR was a separate corporation from Ladd 
Christensen's company but was also a branch office. PCR is aware o' 
, I 
no rule or regulation precluding a branch brokerage from being 
separately incorporated. Reed and the Utah Department of Business 
Regulations treated Sk:,·line Realty as a branch brokerage of Ladd 
Christensen. Harry Reed was listed as the official Real Estate 
Broker for Skyline. (Record on Appeal p. 783 - Ex. 46.) 
6. PCR disagrees with appellant's factual assertions claiming 
Reed was never a broker for PCR nor that PCR was licensed by the 
state. Skyline Realty was a branch brokerage with Harry Reed as the 
licensed broker. (Record on Appeal p. 773 - Ex. 43; Record on Appeal 
pp. 782-783 - Ex. 46.) Skyline Realty was the assumed name for PCR 
as will be established in subsequent discussions. 
7. PCR does not know the dates on which appellant's counsel 
first inquired of the office of the Secretary of State to ascertain 
if a certificate to conduct business under the assumed name of 
Skyline Realty had been filed by PCR. PCR contends it was not 
advised until late in the trial that appellant was going to 
challenge capacity. (T. 586-587.) Further, PCR contends the 
factual investigation by appellant's counsel missed certain 
documents in the office of the Secretary of State which indicated 
that in fact PCR did file an assumed name certificate for Skyline 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Realty. These factual circumstances will be discussed in greater 
detail in subsequent portions of this brief. Similarly, PCR will 
analyze the claim that PCR was not a licensed corporate real estate 
broker. PCR contends that under its assumed name of Skyline Realty 
with its broker/branch manager Harry Reed, PCR was entitled to act 
as a real estate brokerage. 
8. Reed testified that for purposes of this lawsuit PCR, 
Skyline Realty and Investment Company, and Skyline Realty, Inc., 
were different names utilized by the same corporate entity. 
9. PCR disagrees with appellant that there was no evidence 
proffered or presented that any assumed name certificate had been 
filed. PCR specifically asserts that a proffer was made that in fact 
the assumed name certificate had been filed. (T. 651, 653.) 
10. Appellant is in error in claiming respondents first claimed 
appellant had waived any capacity defense only during the final 
argument. PCR objected to the evidence relating to capacity on the 
grounds that there was no defense in the pleadings claiming Reed was 
not a broker and such a defense would have to be raised 
affirmatively. (T. 587.) Further, PCR objected to the exhibits 
which related to the lack of filing of an assumed name certificate. 
There is a significant discussion on the record concerning the 
objection. (T. 638-641.) The argument concerning the objection 
relates specifically to the issue of surprise and to the issue of 
capacity. The Trial Court ruled that respondents' counsel was not 
-5-
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surprised and that respondents in fact had the same opportunity to 
look at the records as appellant. The section of this brief that 
deals with the filing of the assumed name certificate demonstrates 
that respondents were in fact surprised and could have met the 
evidence given adequate notice. Therefore the ruling was in error. 
11. Gary Cole has a real estate sales license issued by the 
State of Utah. PCR doe~ not know what appellant means wherein it 
claims that Cole was licensed under Christensen as a "primary 
broker" and under Reed as a "broker/branch manager". PCR is unable 
to find any statute or regulation defining the terms primary broker 
and therefore is unable to understand the nature of the 
characterization asserted by appellant. Exhibit P. 46, cited by 
appellant as authority for the proposition, does not list Ladd 
Christensen as a primary broker over Gary Cole. Exhibit P. 46 
indicates on the second page that Harry Reed is the official broker 
under whom Gary Cole was operating. 
12. There was a prior lawsuit between Taylor and Unionamerica 
and there was a listing agreement and a settlement agreement that 
arose out of that lawsuit. PCR did not know the specific terms of 
the agreement nor did it participate in the prior litigation. The 
settlement agreement required appellant to perform the usual real 
estate broker activities encumbant upon a listing broker. The Trial 
Court found that appellant in fact discharged all obligations to be 
performed pursuant to the settlement agreement. 
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13. The settlement agreement provided that Taylor was to obtain 
the listing on properties sold by Unionamerica in Park City. It 
further provided there would be a 6% commission on sales of 
properties which would be split 60% to the selling broker and 40% to 
the listing broker. The settlement agreement does not require that 
the payment would first be made to the listing broker who would then 
split the commissions with the selling broker. 
14. There was no written multiple listing agreement in Park 
City. Harry Reed testified that generally brokers would split 
commissions with 60% going to the selling broker and 40% going to the 
listing broker. PCR disagrees with appellant that in fact the 
arrangement in Park City would qualify as a multiple listing 
service. Reed testified that although brokers would generally split 
commissions on the 60/40 basis, Hal Taylor as the broker for Hal 
Taylor Associates had not entered into that agreement. (T. 480.) 
Reed indicated there was an informal listing arrangement between 
certain brokers (not Hal Taylor) in Park City. Reed testified it was 
a simple understanding between brokers concerning the 60/40 split 
rather than a signed agreement. (T. 491.) Harry Reed attempted to 
abide by the customs and practices of realtors in Park City. PCR 
affirmatively alleges that although Taylor had not participated 
generally in the Park City oral agreement that fact is not relevant 
to this inquiry since there were two occasions that Reed and Taylor 
specifically agreed to the 60/40 split should the village land be 
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sold. One of those agreements occurred prior to the time Davis ever 
cameonthesceneandoneafter. (T. 56-57, 117-119, 150.) 
15. Stevenson, a vice-president of Unionamerica, had a general 
understanding that the brokers in Park City would split a listing on 
a 60/40 basis. Further, Stevenson testified that the reason he put 
the 60/40 requirement in the settlement agreement with Taylor 
(Exhibit 2) was to mak~ certain there would be no question ~ 
anyone's mind that they could get a commission if they could sell the 
property. (T. 292.) 
16. At the time the settlement agreement was entered into, 
Unionamerica signed the listing agreement with appellant relating 
to the village land. 
17. PCR absolutely disagrees with the characterization of 
appellant in paragraph 25 that the evidence demonstrated 
Unionamerica was unwilling to sell the village land for the listing 
price. The pages referred to in appellant's brief (T. 382, 383), 
simply do not say what appellant contends. Reading the pages in 
question the only thing that can accurately be taken from testimony 
is that Unionamerica did not know whether they wanted to sell the 
village land at $1,685,000.00. Stevenson never said he was 
not willing to sell the village land for that amount of money. 
Stevenson did not testify that he had any hidden price that he kept 
from Hal Taylor. Stevenson stated he didn't know whether he wanted 
to sell it for $1,685,000.00 and he never told Taylor he would not 
-8-
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sell for that amount of money. Stevenson did not say that in fact he 
would not sell for that amount of money if an offer were received. 
Ultimately Stevenson sold the village land for less than 
$1,685,000.00. 
18. Stevenson did testify that Dempsey indicated a definite 
interest in purchasing the village land. (T. 306.) Stevenson did 
not testify that he did not properly respond to Dempsey's overtures. 
Stevenson merely said that he did not want to come off his asking 
price by giving a counter offer back to Dempsey. Further, Stevenson 
did not testify that he was severely reprimanded by his boss at 
Unionamerica. Stevenson merely said that he considered he received 
a "chewing out" when Stevenson's boss told Stevenson to take care of 
the Dempsey situation and respond to the offer. (T. 310.) PCR 
cannot find any indication of a "severe reprimand". 
19. Judge Croft ruled that: 
"the settlement agreement and the listing 
agreement contemplate that other parties 
not involved in the lawsuit might find 
buyers for the listed properties and 
negotiate a sale therefore, and that 
neither agreement contains any express or 
implied provisions that Unionamerica or 
Ramshire would direct any "walk-in buyer" 
to plaintiffs. Such issues are thus now 
resolved for all future proceedings in 
this case." 
The ruling was made pursuant to a motion for summary judgment 
or in the alternative partial summary judgment. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20. Judge Sawaya properly indicated it was not his 
function to overrule Judge Croft. Paragraph 27 of the Findings 
of Fact made a further determination that Skyline Realty fully 
performed all of the obligations required of a selling broker 
under the fee splitting agreement reached between Skyline and 
appellant. (Appendix , Finding of Fact 27.) This finding is 
independent of Judge Croft's finding and in and of itself would 
operate as an independent basis for recovery by Skyline. 
21. The definition of a "walk-in," for purposes of this 
case is a potential buyer who comes to the owner unsolicited 
and is not referred to the owner by a licensed real estate 
agent. 
22. The evidence is disputed regarding custom and practice 
as applied to the listing arrangement in Park City and 
appellant's part of the arrangement. However, regardless of 
the custom of practice, in this action Skyline became eligible 
to become a selling broker and particpate in the commission 
because: (a) Appellant and Unionamerica entered into the 
settlement agreement specifically providing that a selling 
broker would be entitled to receive 60% of the commission 
(Exhibit 2); and (b) Hal Taylor made a specific agreement with 
each of the brokers in Park City right after signing the 
listing agreement that he would split the commission 60/40 
should any of those real tors be able to sell the property· (T · 
56-57, 117-119, 150.) 
-10-
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31. The settlement agreement (Exhibit 2) did not specify 
the details of any listing required. PCR disagrees with 
appellant that there was credible testimony disclosing customs 
and practices in the State of Utah which defining differences 
between an exclusive right to sell or an exclusive agency 
listing. Each listing is nothing more than a contract which 
sets out its own terms and conditions. Hal Taylor is the only 
witness called by appellant who had experience in Park City who 
attempted to explain the differences between the two different 
types of listings. Hal Taylor specifically testified that he 
had never had any experience with an agreement known as an 
exclusive agency contract. (T. 137.) Hal Taylor testified 
that his understanding as to the differentiation came from 
reading it in a book rather than gaining such an understanding 
from customs and practices in the industry. (T. 138.) The only 
other witness called by appellant in an attempt to establish 
such customs and practices was Edward J. Conry, an Assistant 
Professor of Business Administration at Utah State University. 
Although Mr. Conry was initially questioned concerning customs 
and practices regarding the difference between an exclusive 
agency contract and an exclusive right to sell contract, Mr. 
Conry subsequently testified in fact he did not have the 
background enabling him to comment on a comparison. Mr. Conry 
specifically stated that any distinctions he knew of between an 
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exclusive right to sell and an exclusive agency listing were 
pure speculation. (T. 580.) Conry specifically stated that he 
had had very little experience with exclusive agency contracts 
and was guessing as to their characteristics. (T. 580-581.) 
To quote Conry: "I am incompetent to articulate clearly what 
industry practices are with regard to the exclusive agency." 
(T. 581.) 
24. Reed testified that one of the standard forms in his 
office was the same form that was signed by Unionamerica with 
regard to the listing on the village land involved herein. 
However, Reed also testified that he did not know which listing 
form Taylor had with Unionamerica. (T. 448.) Reed also 
testified that generally with a special piece of property such 
as the village land more often than not there was a specially 
created listing contract rather than a standard form. (T. 
448.) 
25. PCR agrees with some of the statements made in 
paragraph 34 of appellant's Statement of Facts. However, 
appellant casts them in a light in which they were not received 
at trial. Stevenson did not couch his desire that other 
brokers be able to sell the village land in terms of whether or 
not such a desire was consistent or inconsistent with an 
exclusive right to sell. Therefore, in order to fairly analyze 
the factual statements contained in paragraph 34 of 
-12-
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appellant's brief, PCR will go through each fact and give its 
understanding as to what was introduced and received at trial. 
(a) (b) (c) Stevenson had not listed the village 
land prior to entering into the settlement agreement with 
Taylor because Stevenson thought there would be more 
inducement for realtors to sell the land if they could 
receive the full commission. When Stevenson executed the 
settlement agreement with Taylor (Exhibit 2), Stevenson 
required the 60/40 split commission so that other 
realtors in Park City would have the incentive to make a 
sale. Neither the settlement agreement (Exhibit 2) nor 
the listing agreement (Exhibit 3) sets forth any 
obligation of Unionamerica with regard to a "walk-in" 
purchaser. 
(d) Mr. Ray Johnson, the representative of Greater 
Park City Company, testified that there was an oral 
agreement between Greater Park City Company and appellant 
wherein Greater Park City Company would refer walk-in 
purchasers to Hal Taylor Associates. (T. 203.) It should 
be noted that Greater Park City Company and Unionamerica 
were different companies who both entered into an 
agreement to settle pending litigation with Hal Taylor 
when the listing agreements were signed. Stevenson 
testified that although Greater Park City Company may 
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have entered into a separate oral agreement to refer walk-
in' s to appellant, Unionamerica did not make such an oral 
agreement. (T. 295-297.) The Trial Court in its fact 
finding function determined that Stevenson told the truth 
and entered a specific finding that no oral agreement 
existed which modified the settlement agreement and 
which, therefore, ~ould have required Unionamerica to 
refer walk-in's to Hal Taylor. (Appendix A, Finding 11.) 
It should further be noted that Stevenson's version of the 
conversation between Taylor and Johnson is different than 
that presented by appellant in its brief. Stevenson 
testified that at the time of the settlement, Hal Taylor 
indicated to Greater Park City Company that Greater Park 
City Company was not listing all of its properties with 
Hal Taylor. Since GPCC was not listing all of its 
properties, Hal Taylor wanted to be protected in the event 
a person came along during a subsequent period and 
requested that GPCC sell a particular piece of property 
that was not listed. According to Stevenson, Ray Johnson 
agreed that should a purchaser approach GPCC about an 
unlisted property, Hal Taylor would receive a commission 
in the event a sale occurred. Stevenson did not believe 
that the agreement between GPCC and Taylor referred to the 
type of walk-in involved wherein a property was already 
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listed and a potential purchaser merely wanted to be put 
in touch with a real estate agent. (T. 295-297.) 
Appellant has apparently confused the two together. 
(e) PCR agrees that the oral understanding between 
Taylor and GPCC occurred because GPCC was not listing all 
of its properties. PCR disagrees with appellant's 
contention that the only reason the oral agreement 
between appellant and Unionamerica was not reached 
relating to a walk-in was because there were no properties 
to be listed. Stevenson specifically indicated that 
appellant's counsel was confusing the term walk-in as 
used in this case with the term walk-in referred to in the 
agreement between GPCC and Hal Taylor. Stevenson 
specifically indicated that there was no agreement to 
refer a walk-in such as Mr. Davis to Hal Taylor. The Trial 
Court believed Mr. Stevenson. (T. 294-302.) 
26. A listing broker may put signs on the property with the 
listing broker's name, address and telephone number and that 
generally the listing broker has a better access than the 
owner. PCR disagrees with appellant's contention that under an 
exclusive right to sell listing, the broker is entitled to any 
referral the owner might make. The portions of the transcript 
cited by appellant simply do not support appellant in that 
contention. 
-15-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27. With regard to the factual assertions by appellant 
relating to the nature of the legal arrangement between 
brokers, there is substantial disagreement. Appellant's 
assertions are mainly argument and are not indicative of 
evidence received at trial. In order to focus this issue, PCR 
must set forth its belief as to the legal relationships 
existing between the parties involved in this case. 
(a) PCR disagrees with appellant that the selling 
broker becomes an agent of the listing broker and a sub-
agent of the owner. There is no custom or practice 
evidence before the Court establishing such a finding. 
With regard to distributing money from a sale, there is no 
evidence indicating a selling broker only has access to 
the money through the listing broker. In fact, evidence 
received indicates in Park City that the selling broker is 
the entity who generally collecting and distributing the 
money. (T. 602-605.) Reed testified that with regard to 
Skyline's transactions with Taylor, prior to the sale of 
the village land, the selling broker received and 
disbursed the money in ten out of ten instances. (T. 
604.) 
(b) PCR disagrees with several of the factual 
contentions made by appellant that there was evidence of a 
custom and practice in the real estate industry requiring 
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an owner to refer a "walk- in" to a listing broker. There 
was no credible testimony whatsoever relating to that 
specific issue which established such a custom and 
practice in Park City. The only possible evidence 
appellant could be referring to would be the testimony of 
appellant's purported expert who gave a legal opinion as 
to the obligation for referring a walk-in. Clearly the 
legal opinion was not binding on the Court. Appellant has 
not cited nor can appellant cite to any credible evidence 
relating to a custom and practice involving walk-ins 
since appellants introduced no such evidence. Even had 
appellant introduced such evidence, it is extremely 
doubtful whether Unionamerica could be held as a 
contractual obligation to a custom and practice. 
28. On May 15, 1978, a portion of the village land was 
conveyed by Unionamerica to Jack W. Davis, Inc. Pursuant to 
the findings of the Trial Court, appellant was entitled to 40% 
of the $96,000 and PCR to the remaining 60%. (Appendix A, 
paragraph 6, Conclusions of Law.) 
29. PCR concedes that Reed and Cole acted as agents for 
Davis regarding portions of this transaction. 
30. Paragraph 42 of appellant's brief is nothing more than 
argument completely ignoring portions of the record. Since the 
facts contained in paragraph 42 directly relate to PCR' s 
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involvement in the sale, appellees find it necessary to go into 
great detail to accurately reflect the Trial Court record. 
The appellant attempts to take the position that PCR is 
not entitled to the commission because PCR was not the 
"procuring cause" of the sale. In support of this position 
appellant has drawn a chart in its brief of several events 
which is supposed to d2monstrate the minimum nature of PCR's 
involvement in the sale. (Appellant's brief pp. 37-40.) An 
analysis of all of the facts indicates that the chart is 
neither complete nor accurate. Further, appellant totally 
misunderstands the efforts made by PCR to insure that the 
transaction would go through. 
Davis heard of the village land from a Mr. Luce who is on 
the Board of Directors of Unionamerica. However, Davis was 
merely told by Luce that there was some property in Park City 
that Davis might be interested in. (Davis Depo. pp. 14, 17-18. 
Davis testified through deposition which by stipulation was 
not transcribed as a part of the trial transcript. Therefore, 
references to the Davis testimony will be to his deposition.) 
At no time did Davis indicate he was going to purchase the land 
prior to seeing it or prior to having communications with 
Unionamerica concerning his purchase price. There is no 
testimony in the record indicating Davis decided to purchase 
the property prior to visiting it. Indeed, it would be absurd 
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to believe Mr. Davis would spend 1.6 million dollars for a 
piece of property he had never seen nor discussed with the 
owner in any depth whatsoever. All of the communications prior 
to Davis' seeing the property merely amounted to Davis' 
expressing an interest, a meeting being arranged for Davis to 
look at the property, and the sending of a feasibility study to 
Davis which set forth a possible use of the land. Davis then 
went to Park City to look at the land. On the night before his 
visit, Stevenson, one of the officers of Unionamerica and a 
resident of California, was advised by his superior Volk that 
Volk would not be able to meet with Davis. At about that time 
Mr. Stevenson learned that Hal Taylor was in the State of 
California and was not available in Utah. Mr. Stevenson, after 
learning that Mr. Volk would not be able to participate with 
Davis in looking at the property then called Gary Cole, a 
licensed real estate salesman and resident of Park City. 
Stevenson met with Reed and Cole for approximately ten or 
fifteen minutes on the evening of October 3 and inquired if 
Reed and Cole would be available if Davis required assistance. 
Reed and Cole indicated they would make themselves available. 
(T. 339.) Later that evening Mr. Stevenson met Mr. Davis and 
his wife at a restaurant in Park City where they discussed for 
several hours various items including the kind of business the 
Davis' had, their preferred method of doing business, Davis' 
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questions concerning Park City in general and the feasibility 
study. (T. 341.) As a result of the meeting with the Davis', 
Stevenson called either Reed or Cole and requested a breakfast 
meeting the next morning. (T. 342. ) At breakfast the 
following morning all five of the individuals met (Reed, Cole, 
Stevenson, and Mr. and Mrs. Davis). The individuals then left 
in Reed's car and the D~vis', for the first time, saw the 
village land. Reed testified that at the meeting on the 
morning of the 4th at the Eating Establishment Davis asked 
several questions, which Reed and Cole were able to answer 
concerning what was happening in Park City, where things were 
going, and what types of things the planning people might do. 
(T. 457-458.) Reed testified that they talked about the 
village land, industry in Park City, revenue bonds, and methods 
available for financing property purchases. Reed also 
explained prices of condominiums in the area, what other 
projects were being built, and in fact showed Mr. Davis other 
projects. (T. 458-459.) Reed testified that they did a 
"pretty thorough job of presenting the real estate industry in 
Park City to Mr. Davis." (T. 459.) Reed indicated that his 
involvement was much greater than Stevenson's concerning what 
was occurring in Park City, development, financing, and 
revenue bonds. (T. . ) 
-20-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Davis' recollection of the meeting coincides with 
that of Reed and Stevenson. Davis testified that within a few 
minutes of the meeting with Reed and Cole, Davis decided he 
wanted Reed and Cole to represent him regarding Park City 
activities (Davis Depo. p. 35.) Davis further testified that 
his manner of doing business was that he always wanted local 
people to participate in such transactions. Davis decided 
after meeting with Reed and Cole a very short time that these 
people were knowledgeable, and met his needs with regard to 
Park City. (Davis Depo. p. 35.) 
After seeing the property and receiving an explanation 
from Reed regarding the general nature of industry in Park 
City, Davis returned to California. Subsequently, Reed 
testified that he received a telephone call from Davis 
requesting Reed and Cole were asked to travel to San Diego to 
discuss preparing an earnest money offer to purchase. It is 
apparently appellant's contention that a few days after Davis 
visited the property, Davis called Volk and orally agreed to 
purchase the land at Unionamerica's asking price prior to Reed 
and Cole making the trip to prepare and present an earnest 
money offer. Appellant also contends that the communication 
between Davis and Volk resulted in Volk' s ordering Stevenson to 
ensure consummation of the village land sale. The attempts to 
establish is that Reed and Cole needed to do nothing further in 
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order to cause the sale to go through. However, Stevenson 
denied that in fact Volk called and told him that Davis had 
agreed to the purchase. (T. 343.) Davis also denied making 
such a call (Davis Depo. p. 33). Reed testified that prior to 
going to California to discuss drafting an earnest money 
agreement with Davis, Reed was never advised that an agreement 
had already been made a~d Reed need only work out its terms. 
(T. 466.) The Trial Court was entitled in its fact finding 
function to believe Stevenson and Davis rather than Volk. In 
fact, it is difficult to believe Davis would commit to a 1.6 
million dollar purchase without the dickering that 
subsequently occurred. However, it is irrelevant whether the 
Trial Court believed Stevenson and Davis or Volk. The truth of 
the matter is appellant cannot contend there was any kind of 
binding offer and acceptance prior to the submission and 
acceptance of the earnest money offer, which was completely 
handled by Reed and Cole. 
Subsequent to the meeting in Park City, Reed and Cole 
contacted Davis and made an appointment to go to San Diego. (T. 
410.) On the 16th of October they went to San Diego, California 
and spent the evening with Mr. and Mrs. Davis at their home. 
During that evening they talked about Park City. (T. 411.) 
Further, Reed and Cole took to San Diego an earnest money blank 
on a Utah form. (T. 411.) On the morning of October 17th, 
-22-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Reed, Cole, and Davis went to Davis' office to discuss the 
terms of the offer which were eventually memorialized in 
Exhibit "9". As a result of those discussions a somewhat 
complicated earnest money was drafted. The buyer under the 
earnest money was required to deposit $5,000 with Skyline. (T. 
414.) The offer was presented by Reed and Cole and after some 
further discussions was accepted by Unionamerica. 
A very essential portion of this transaction that 
appellant completely ignores in its brief concerns the period 
of time subsequent to the signing of the earnest money 
agreement. According to appellant's brief, the transaction 
was completed when the real estate agreement was executed by 
Unionamerica and Davis on October 24, 1977. That simply is not 
the case. A close reading of the earnest money agreement and 
the real estate agreement (Ex. 12) both of which were executed 
in October of 1977 demonstrates that the buyer did not simply 
agree to pay the purchase price to Unionamerica. The buyer, a 
developer out of California, kept his options open by allowing 
himself a period of time wherein he could withdraw from the 
subject transaction. Exhibit "9", the Earnest Money Offer, 
made the sale contingent on numerous conditions set forth on an 
attachment "B" which was part of the earnest money agreement. 
Further, the sale was contingent upon buyer's acceptance of the 
preliminary title report. Attachment "B" to the earnest money 
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agreement provided that there would be a final escrow agreement 
which would have to be prepared. It was contemplated that in 
fact for a transaction this complex, the parties would 
immediately meet in Utah to draft a contract. The earnest 
money further provided that the closing for the sale would be 
held within 160 days after the final agreement was signed. The 
final agreement was th~ real estate agreement which was 
negotiated and executed approximately one week after the 
earnest money on October 24, 1977. A close reading of the 
exhibit demonstrates that the transaction was far from 
complete. 
Jack W. Davis, Inc., the buyer, made certain that an 
escape clause was included wherein Davis could analyze whether 
or not the property was suitable for development. For example, 
within 60 days of the signing of the real estate agreement 
buyer was entitled to terminate the contract and receive the 
entire down payment back. If the transaction were terminated 
by Davis between 60 and 100 days, various penalty provisions 
applied. For example, between 60 and 90 days, the buyer would 
receive $20,000 and the seller would receive $10,000. More 
than 90 days the seller would receive $20,000 and the buyer 
would receive $10,000. More than 120 days the buyer would 
receive nothing back and the seller would receive $30,000. In 
other words, Davis knew there would be substantial work to be 
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done prior to determining if the purchase was feasible. The 
parties further agreed that no commission would be due until 
after the initial closing which would occur on or before April 
1, 1978, allowing time for the withdrawal periods by Davis to 
expire. Harry Reed testified that most of the work in putting 
the sale together actually occurred after the signing of 
Exhibit "12". In other words, for the commission to be due, 
Davis would have to decide that he was not going to withdraw 
from the contract and would press forward. 
Reed testified that in the approximate seven month period 
between the time the real estate sales agreement was signed and 
the closing occurred, he spent an extensive amount of time 
working on the project and Gary Cole spent almost full time 
working on the project. (T. 597-598.) Reed testified that he 
was well aware the transaction was not final until after the 
interim periods had passed and Davis decided the project made 
economic sense. (T. 598.) Reed testified that to ensure the 
property would be viable and the sale would occur his office 
did the following: 
(a) Worked with Davis and his architect to come up 
with ideas of types of things to put on the village land. 
For example, Reed testified that although the feasibility 
study provided for only 44 units, the work Reed and Cole 
did with the architect ultimately resulted in 82 units 
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being placed on the village land. That significantly 
reduced the cost of the land per unit. (T. 598-599.) 
(b) Reed testified that he and Cole worked with 
architects and engineers in order to have the plans 
approved by various goverrunental bodies. (T. 599.) Reed 
testified they went to planning commission meetings and 
also discussed their proposed plan for the village land 
individually with members of the planning commission. 
Reed testified they worked closely with the Snyderville 
Sewer Basin Board and expended an extensive amount of time 
with the Fire Board, a separate goverrunental entity. Reed 
testified he and Cole attended 15 to 20 meetings with 
goverrunental bodies alone in an attempt to gain approval 
of their proposed plan for the village land. (T. 600.) 
Reed testified they obtained a conditional use permit 
within existing zoning requirements due to the novel 
approach of using a hotel exception which enabled them to 
build more units on the village land. All of this 
activity took place prior to the final closing and during 
the time Mr. Davis could have withdrawn. (T. 600.) Reed 
further testified that Taylor was not present at any of 
those meetings nor did he assist in preparing for the 
meetings. 
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In addition to the foregoing, Reed testified that Reed and 
Cole worked extensively with possible lenders and/or friends 
of Jack Davis who would assist or encourage people to purchase 
units proposed for construction on the village land. These 
efforts strengthened Davis' commitments to purchase the 
village land. (T. 601.) Reed indicated that Davis brought key 
financial people to Park City and Reed and Cole spent 
substantial amounts of time selling the town and selling the 
project in order to get them excited about Park City. Reed 
indicated they dealt with approximately 20 people just meeting 
acquaintances sent up from various financial institutions. 
Reed testified that he and Cole even went to Los Angeles and 
located the first limited partner to purchase a portion of the 
limited partnership which was to own the village land. Reed 
indicated that people Reed obtained invested $100,000 in the 
limited partnership. These were people Reed had worked with 
before. (T. 602.) 
It is a complete misstatement of the evidence to indicate 
the sale was completed merely by signing the earnest money 
agreement or the real estate agreement. The appellant Taylor, 
did not even believe that the signing of the October agreements 
consummated the sale. Taylor objected to the earnest money 
because it was nothing more than an option. Taylor did not 
think it was a very good offer because Davis was tying up the 
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property for a substantial amount of time by only paying 
$25, 000. (T. 86, 131.) Taylor recognized that most of the work 
on this kind of transaction is often done after the initial 
documents are signed but prior to the closing. (T. 159-160.) 
31. At the closing wherein the monies were to be 
disbursed, Reed and Cole appeared with Davis and Stevenson to 
finalize the transactic~. Taylor appeared at that meeting and 
contended that Reed and Cole were not entitled to any of the 
commission. (T. 90.) It was and apparently is Taylor's 
position that because Unionamerica had first encountered the 
buyer, PCR was not entitled to the commission from the sale. 
32. When the dispute about the monies became apparent, 
Unionamerica decided to deposit the funds in an escrow account 
until the matter could be agreed upon by the various parties or 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. There is no 
evidence that Reed or Cole ever had control over the monies. 
33. Reed and Cole contended that Taylor had lost his right 
to the commission by virtue of Taylor's breaching the 
settlement agreement. It is PCR's position that when Taylor 
refused to give 60% of the commission to Skyline he breached 
his contract with Unionamerica. 
34. PCR agrees that the Trial Court refused to admit into 
evidence the Spring, 1979 issue of volume III issue of "Utah 
Real Estate News". PCR asserts that the Trial Court was 
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correct in that it did not admit the article and further, even 
if the Trial Court was incorrect, there was no possible 
prejudicial effect on appellant. Appellant is attempting to 
claim PCR was a sub-agent of Taylor by virtue of the article 
contained in the Real Estate News. There is nothing in the 
evidence that would establish custom or practice that would 
make PCR a sub-agent of Taylor and the article merely states a 
legal conclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING A SELLING BROKER' S 
COMMISSION TO PCR. 
A. JUDGE CROFT 'S ORDER DOES NOT PRECLUDE PCR FROM RECEIVING THE 
COMMISSION. 
Appellant's position with regard to Judge Croft's Order 
granting partial summary judgment is not a reasonable 
interpretation of the Order itself. The only way appellant can 
contend the Order is contradictory is by stretching the language 
out of proportion from its obvious meaning. Judge Croft merely 
looked at the two agreements between Hal Taylor and Unionamerica 
and determined that based upon those agreements there was no 
requirement that Unionamerica refer any walk-in purchasers to 
Taylor. Judge Croft did not hold, as appellant contends, that 
for another realtor to gain a part of the commission that 
realtor must (1) encounter the purchaser in a manner other than 
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Davis was encountered - as a walk-in; and (2) negotiate the 
transaction. Judge Croft specifically held that since 
Unionamerica was not obligated to refer walk-ins to Taylor, 
other realtors could find and negotiate for the sale of the 
land. Since the motion for summary judgment came up in the 
context of whether or not under these facts Unionamerica was 
obligated to refer Da·;is to Taylor and Judge Croft found 
Unionamerica was not so obligated, it is inconceivable that 
Judge Croft could mean what appellant contends he did mean. 
Rather than further burdening the record by repeating the 
arguments made by Unionamerica in its brief, PCR hereby adopts 
such arguments. In any event, the totality of the order clearly 
indicates Judge Croft did not rule that PCR was not entitled to 
the commission because they did not first encounter Davis. If 
Judge Croft had meant to say that he would have done so. 
B. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD ESTABLISHING 
PCR AS THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SUBJECT SALE. 
THE LISTING AND THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Appellant contends that the agreement between Taylor and 
Unionamerica was an "exclusive right to sell" agreement rather than 
what has been categorized an "exclusive agency" agreement. 
Unionamerica has contradicted appellant's position by pointing out 
that the settlement agreement modified the listing agreement in a 
very substantial manner. Normally, a listing realtor has the option 
of deciding whether he wants to split his commission and allow 
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another listing realtor to sell property or to try to sell it 
himself. In this instance Hal Taylor was not given that option but 
was required by virtue of the settlement agreement to split the 
commission on a 60/40 basis with any other realtor who was able to 
sell the property. Unionamerica, in its brief, argues the import of 
the settlement agreement as it related to the listing agreement. 
PCR will not repeat the arguments made by Unionamerica. However, it 
is PCR's position that it doesn't matter whether the agreement is 
categorized as an exclusive right to sell or an exclusive agency or 
an exclusive right to sell that was modified by the listing 
agreement. There is no question under the agreement that another 
realtor was entitled to sell the property and receive 60% of the 6% 
commission from such sale. The only issue created by this 
litigation is whether or not Unionamerica was obligated to refer a 
walk-in purchaser such as Davis to Hal Taylor rather than referring 
the walk-in to another relater who might become entitled to the 60% 
portion of the commission. Judge Croft specifically found that the 
agreements did not expressly nor impliedly create an obligation on 
the part of Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to Hal Taylor. Appellant 
has not cited a single case wherein language similar to that in the 
listing agreement was interpreted to require the owner to refer a 
walk-in to the listing realtor. PCR believes that no such case was 
cited because none exists. 
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The closest analogous case PCR was able to find to the facts in 
this situation is Whitney Investment Company v. Westview Devel~­
ment Company, (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 594, 602-603, 78 Cal.Rptr. 302. 
In Whitney the Court of Appeals in California faced a fact situation 
similar to that involved in this case. Whitney was a broker who sued 
an owner to recover a commission due under an exclusive listing 
agreement for sale of property wherein the owner had sold the 
property through another broker. At trial the president of 
plaintiff indicated that although the agreement was an exclusive 
listing agreement which provided the owner had to pay commissions to 
the plaintiff if the sale was made by either the owner, another 
broker, or the listing broker, there was a side agreement that 
implied there might be sales by other brokers. In that side 
agreement there was a provision that the listing realtor was to get 
50% and the selling broker was to get 50%. The defendant sold 55 
properties through another broker. The plaintiff's claims for a 
commission based on those facts was denied because, in the words of 
the Court: 
"While the words "hereby lists -·- -·- * 
exclusively and irrevocably" denote an 
exclusive agency prohibiting the owner from 
selling through another agency (E. A. Strout, 
Western Realty Agency v. Gregoire, 101 
Cal.App.2d 512, 517, 225 P.2d 585), the 
provision of the agreement requiring payment of 
commissions to plaintiffs if a sale is made by 
another broker, as explained by parol evidence, 
indicated that the parties intended to reserve 
to Westview the right to sell through another 
broker. Mr. Whitney, president of plaintiff 
Whitney Investment Company, conceded that this 
was the understanding of the parties./~ 
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"Thus, the sale through the other broker 
constituted neither a breach by Westview nor 
justification for plaintiffs' nonperformance." 
The fact situation in Whitney is somewhat similar to the fact 
situation in the present case in that in both cases all of the 
parties understood that the owner might sell through a different 
broker. Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell from the facts as 
are set forth in Whitney whether or not the purchaser was a "walk-
in". Whitney may be identical to the facts in this case but it is 
impossible to tell from the opinion. 
Appellant would apparently like the Court to make a 
determination that the first encounter with any purchaser is in fact 
the procuring cause. This Court has never so held nor have 
respondents been able to find any court which holds the mere 
encounter of the ultimate purchaser is sufficient to establish the 
procuring cause. The courts that have analyzed what would 
constitute "procuring cause" have utilized a variety of tests to 
determine whether or not a broker is a procuring cause of a sale. 
Most of the cases in this context arise out of a dispute between an 
owner and a broker as to whether or not a real estate commission is 
even due. This case differs from the normal case in that in this 
action the owner does not contest that a commission is in fact due 
and owing. The only question is whether or not Skyline Realty was 
the selling broker within the meaning of the settlement agreement 
entered into between Hal Taylor and Unionamerica and/or whether or 
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not Skyline Realty was the selling broker within the meaning of the 
agreement between Hal Taylor and Skyline Realty which occurred 
substantially prior to Davis' becoming interested in the property. 
(T. 117-118.) 
PCR agrees that one of the elements a court might look to in 
order to determine whether or not a broker was the procuring cause of 
a sale would involve the first encounter with a purchaser. For 
example, it is easy to conceive that in the sale of a home where a 
broker takes a purchaser and shows the house and based upon such 
showing the purchaser executes an earnest money, the broker was 
probably the procuring cause of the sale. However, it does not 
follow as appellant would apparently contend that the first 
encounter with a purchaser always determines what constitutes the 
procuring cause of the sale. In this instance the sale was not made 
by merely telling the purchaser about the village property. There 
were numerous events which caused the sale to go through. In the 
Statement of Facts, those events are set forth in detail in 
paragraph 30. An analysis of those facts reveals that most of the 
work that caused the sale to go through actually occurred afterthe 
October real estate contract was signed. (Exhibit "12") Reed 
testified that Cole worked full time to put the deal together and 
Reed spent a substantial portion of his time from October until May. 
Appellant has constructed a chart in its brief attempting to show 
the various events that related to the sale. (Appellant's brief, 
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pp. 37-40.) That chart is extremely misleading and is in fact 
inaccurate in that it excludes events which are obviously relevant 
to the determination. Basically, all that occurred prior to Reed 
and Cole getting involved was that Luce mentioned to Davis that he 
knew of some property Davis might be interested in. Luce caused a 
communication between Volk and Davis to occur wherein they agreed 
they would meet in Park City and look at the land. In the meantime 
Volk, president of Unionamerica, caused a feasibility study to be 
sent to Davis so that Davis would have some familiarity with the 
land. That is the sum total of the occurrences prior to Davis coming 
to Salt Lake City. Appellant has attempted to take those out and 
categorize them as constituting major events in the sale of the 
land. That is simply not the case. The testimony fairly read, as is 
set forth in paragraph 30 of PCR's Statement of Facts, would 
indicate that almost all of the work which caused the sale of the 
land to go through occurred after Reed and Cole became involved and 
in fact was spearheaded by Reed and Cole. Appellant does not even 
mention that the seven month period that Cole spent full time and 
Reed spent a substantial part of his time subsequent to the signing 
of the agreement creating the conditions that made it close even 
though Hal Taylor admitted at trial that most of the work on this 
type of transaction was done after the signing of the initial 
documents but prior to the closing. (T. 159-160.) It is difficult 
to understand, given these facts, appellant's conclusion that the 
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Trial Judge could not make a factual determination that PCR was the 
procuring cause of this sale. Such a determination simply ignores 
the bulk of the evidence presented and places a total reliance on who 
first encounters the buyer. 
Although it is apparently appellant's contention that 
respondents could not be the procuring cause because they didn't 
introduce the buyer to the property, that theory has been expressly 
rejected by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado. In 
Kern v. Lewis, 472 P.2d 713 (Colo. 1970), the Supreme Court of the 
State of Colorado held that a broker did not establish his right to a 
commission where he merely introduced the eventual buyer to the 
seller. The Court held that the broker must play an active role in 
concluding the sale in order to qualify as the predominating or 
effective cause of the sale. Mere introduction is not enough to 
cause the broker to become a procuring cause just as mere 
introduction of Davis to the property was not the procuring cause. 
It is necessary to look at the entire transaction as was done by the 
Trial Court. 
In Curtis v. Mortensen, 267 P.2d 237 (Utah 1954), this Court 
held that a broker was entitled to a commission because he produced a 
buyer who filed a lawsuit in order to require a seller to 
specifically perform a contract to sell real estate. This Court 
held that when the buyer filed a lawsuit, he put himself in the 
category that a broker is entitled to a commission when he has 
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procured a written binding offer or agreement signed by a ready, 
willing and able purchaser. Garff Realty Co. v. Better 
Buildings, Inc., 234 P.2d 842 (Utah 1951); Reich v. Christopulos, 
256 P.2d 238 (Utah 1953); Sproul v. Parks, 210 P.2d 436 (Utah 
1949); Ogden Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Blakely, 241 P. 221 (Utah 
1925); and Lewis v. Dahl, 161 P.2d 362 (Utah 1945). In the instant 
case Reed and Cole showed the property, went to San Diego and 
obtained a signed earnest money agreement which was accepted by 
Unionamerica from the purchaser; and in fact presented that document 
to Unionamerica. Reed and Cole participated in the drafting and the 
signing of the real estate agreement as well as all of the actions 
that lead to the final closing. There was substantial evidence from 
which the Trial Court could find PCR the procuring cause. 
In Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corporation, 205 P. 2d 1025 
(Cal. 1949), the Supreme Court of the State of California held that 
although a broker had not introduced the purchaser and the owner and 
although the broker was not the first person to tell the ultimate 
purchaser about the real estate, the Trial Court's finding that the 
broker was the efficient cause of the sale could be supported by the 
evidence which demonstrated that only through the efforts of the 
broker over a period of many months were the parties ultimately 
brought together. That case is similar to the instant case in that 
the fact the broker had not first encountered the buyer did not 
preclude the broker from being the procuring cause of the sale. 
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Similarly, in Webster v. Parra, 237 P. 804 (Ct.App. 1925), the Court 
of Appeals in California held that a broker was the efficient agent 
or procuring cause of the sale and was entitled to the commission 
even though the broker was not the first to bring the attention of 
the purchaser to the property nor mention the price thereof. The 
Court held that a broker who has brought the minds of the parties 
together resulting in a contract of purchase and sale is entitled to 
the compensation. 
Other courts have reached the same result. In 
Warrington v. Empey, 590 P.2d 1162 (Nev. 1979), the Supreme Court of 
the State of Nevada reaffirmed an earlier determination and stated 
as follows: 
"It is impossible to measure in quantitative 
units the efforts necessary to constitute 
"procuring cause. Suffice that on the one 
hand it is "conduct that is more than merely 
trifling." (Citation omitted.) Thus in non-
exclusive situations, merely introducing the 
eventual purchaser is not necessarily enough. 
(Citation omitted.) The first broker still may 
be shown to have abandoned efforts or been 
helplessly ineffective. (Citations omitted.)" 
In Vahlberg v. Callaway, 215 P.2d 543 (Okl. 1950), the Supreme Court 
of the State of Oklahoma rejected the proposition that in order to be 
a procuring cause, a broker must call the prospective buyer's 
attention to the property and start the negotiations which culminate 
in a sale. The Court took the more reasonable approach and held that 
a broker was considered the procuring cause if the broker's efforts 
were the foundation upon which the negotiations which result in a 
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sale are based. Even though in Vahlberg the broker had not first 
introduced the party to the property, the Supreme Court held that 
the Trial Court was able under the facts to determine that the broker 
was the procuring cause of the sale. 
None of these findings are contradicted by the case cited in 
appellant's brief of Frederick May v. Dunn, 368 P. 2d 266 (Utah 
1962). In that case this Court made an analysis of the terms "moving 
cause, "proximate cause," "actuating cause," and "procuring 
cause". This Court held that: 
"the extent to which the broker's efforts must 
induce the sale depends on the terms used on the 
contract and the understanding and intention of 
the parties in making such agreement and the 
facts and circumstances of the case. Usually, 
whether the broker first---approaches, or brings 
to the attention of the buyer that the property 
is for sale, or brings the buyer into the 
picture, has considerable weight in 
determining whether the buyer is the procuring 
cause of the sale." (Emphasis added. ) 
Appellant attempts to read that as requiring that the broker in fact 
introduce the property to the buyer. PCR does not believe that is 
the meaning of the ruling. PCR believes that Frederick May requires 
a district court to look at the facts of each case and determine 
whether a broker caused the sale to occur. 
One further factor the Court ought to consider in determining 
whether or not PCR is entitled to a seller's commission would 
involve the meaning of the agreement between appellant and 
Unionamerica which resulted in the settlement of the earlier 
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litigation. In that agreement (Ex. 2) the following statement is 
made: "On all property listed with Taylor, he will be required to 
perform the usual real estate broker activities and will be entitled 
to a commission rate, of six percent (6%), and Taylor will further 
agree to a fee-splitting arrangement giving sixty percent (60%) to 
the selling broker and forty percent (40%) to the listing broker." 
At trial Stevenson who ~as one of the participants who negotiated 
and signed Exhibit 2 testified that his understanding of what was 
meant by a selling realtor in the settlement agreement would be one 
who brought a signed earnest money offer which could be and was 
ultimately accepted by Unionamerica. (T. 378.) The Trial Court 
also made such a finding. (Appendix A, Finding 2 7. ) PCR asserts 
that given the evidence received by the Trial Court, it was 
completely and properly within the prerogative of Judge Sawaya to 
make a finding that PCR was the selling broker within the meaning of 
the settlement agreement. That finding alone under a third party 
beneficiary theory of contracts would justify PCR's receipt of the 
percentage of the commission required by the agreement. 
POINT II 
PCR IS NOT BARRED FROM RECOVERY BECAUSE IT LACKS CAPACITY 
AND/OR STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION. 
PCR will address the issues of standing and capacity jointly 
since they are related. It is apparently appellant's contention 
that PCR is precluded from obtaining a real estate commission 
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because: (1) PCR was not a licensed broker and therefore lacked 
capacity to sue; (2) PCR conducted its business and prosecuted its 
counterclaim under an assumed name without having filed a 
certificate of assumed name - that assumed name being Skyline 
Realty. PCR is treating these as one issue since Skyline Realty was 
clearly a licensed brokerage branch office under the laws of the 
State of Utah. (Exhibits 43, 44, 45.) If PCR was properly acting 
under the assumed name of Skyline Realty, then the argument would 
automatically fail that PCR was not a licensed real estate broker. 
Appellant's capacity argument was predicated upon the 
following assertions: 
1. PCR never filed a certificate of doing business in the 
name of Skyline Realty. 
2. The Department of Business Regulations did not have a 
Park City Reservations, Inc. listed as a broker during the 
relevant period involved in this action. Since Park City 
Reservations, Inc. was never licensed according to the 
Secretary of State to do business in the name of Skyline 
Realty, any recognition by the Department of Business 
Regulations as to Skyline Realty would not grant capacity to 
PCR. 
The evidence relating to whether or not PCR had filed an 
assumed name certificate in the name of Skyline Realty was presented 
on January 30, 1980, the last day of trial that testimony was 
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received. On January 30, for the first time in this action after Mr. 
Linebaugh had rested on behalf of the appellant and after 
respondents had commenced presentation of their defense, appellant 
introduced Exhibit 52 which was a certificate from the Secretary of 
State which would indicate that a search had been made and no record 
existed that Reed, Cole or PCR had ever filed to use the name Skyline 
Realty. At the time thi~ document was introduced, counsel for PCR 
objected on the grounds that the document was hearsay. Rule 63 (17) 
allows certain hearsay evidence to prove the absence of a record in a 
specified official office. That rule is subject to the requirement 
of Rule 64 which states that a party offering such a writing must 
have delivered a copy of it to each adverse party a reasonable time 
before trial unless the judge finds that such adverse party has not 
been unfairly surprised by the failure to deliver such copy. 
Counsel for respondents objected to the admissability of the Exhibit 
based upon Rule 64. (T. 638-641.) The Court overruled the objection 
and admitted the evidence. 
Over night, counsel for Reed, Cole and Skyline attempted to 
determine why no certificate had been filed which would have 
permitted PCR to use the name Skyline Realty. Trial counsel 
contacted the attorney who represented PCR in 1974 when its Articles 
of Incorporation were filed. Counsel was advised that there was 
some serious mistake because the former counsel, Mr. D. Kendall 
Perkins, (the name is misspelled in the transcript in that he is 
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called "Mr. Perkinson") indicated he in fact had filed an assumed 
name certificate which would have allowed PCR to operate in the name 
of Skyline Realty. When counsel learned that the certificate had in 
fact been filed and that there was probably an error in the Secretary 
of State's office, both sides had already rested. At that time, 
prior to the closing arguments being made, counsel for PCR moved 
that the Court allow reopening of evidence so that PCR could call Mr. 
Perkins to testify concerning the filing of the assumed name 
certificate. (T. 651.) The motion was denied and counsel made a 
proffer of evidence. (T. 653.) The proffer indicates that Mr. 
Perkins would testify if allowed that he sent to the Secretary of 
State the Articles of Incorporation for Park City Reservations, 
Inc., including a certificate which would have allowed PCR to do 
business in the name of Skyline Realty. The proffer further 
included the statement that the Secretary of State sent a document 
back to Mr. Perkins requiring a release from an individual who had a 
trade mark in the name Skyline Realty. Mr. Perkins indicated he 
obtained the release and resent the materials to the Secretary of 
State in a letter dated December 10, 1974. On December 11, 1974 the 
Articles of Incorporation of PCR were accepted by the Secretary of 
State and a certificate of incorporation was issued. 
Subsequent to the final argument, PCR's counsel determined 
that certain facts exist which demonstrate how PCR was prejudiced 
and the Trial Court was inadvertently mislead by appellant's 
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counsel. Exhibit 52 is an affidavit from the Secretary of State 
which indicates that neither Harry Reed, Gary Cole, nor PCR ever 
filed an assumed name certificate in the name of Skyline Realty. 
Since Exhibit 52 was introduced right at the end of trial and was 
never given to respondents prior to that time, PCR did not have a 
chance to check the underlying facts with the Secretary of State. 
Subsequent to the trial PCR has had that opportunity and attached to 
this brief as Appendix B is an affidavit from Mr. Douglas S. Foxley, 
an attorney with the Secretary of State's office, that indicates 
that the information on Exhibit 52 was in fact erroneous. Harry 
Reed, in 1973, filed personally for the use of the name "Skyline 
Realty of Park City". The affidavit of Mr. Foxley indicates that 
apparently when Exhibit 52 was prepared a computer search was made 
wherein the information on Exhibit 52 was extracted. However, a 
hand search through the file located Attachment 1 to Appendix B 
which was missed initially. Therefore evidence could have been 
presented that Harry Reed filed for the use of the name Skyline 
Realty in 1973. 
Additionally, a search of the records at the Secretary of 
State's office and an analysis of the correspondence that went back 
and forth between the attorney for PCR and the Secretary of State 
revealed that very probably PCR filed an assumed name certificate to 
be allowed to use the name "Skyline Realty". Although the Secretary 
of State's office is unable to find the application for the d/b/a in 
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the name of Skyline Realty, there are enough documents in the file to 
indicate that in fact such a document was filed and was probably 
lost by the Secretary of State's office. Attachment 3 to the Foxley 
Affidavit (Appendix B) is a letter dated November 18, 1974, to D. 
Kendall Perkins from the office of the Secretary of State. It should 
be noted that Mr. Perkins is the attorney who PCR attempted to call 
after evidence was closed who would have testified he did file for a 
d/b/a in the name of Skyline Realty on behalf of PCR. Attachment 3 
indicates that Mr. Perkins was told the name Skyline Realty was not 
available unless Mr. Perkins obtained the consent of one Mr. 
Williamson to use the name. Clearly, the Secretary of State must 
have had on file the application by PCR to use the name Skyline 
Realty in order to cause the November 18th letter to be generated. 
Mr. Perkins on November 27 sent a letter to Mr. Williamson and 
obtained his release for the name "Skyline Realty". That letter is 
attachment 2 to the Foxley Affidavit. The affidavit of Mr. Foxley 
indicates that in the file of Park City Reservations, Inc., 
Attachment 2 referring to Skyline Realty was found. Attachment 4 to 
the Foxley Affidavit, a letter dated December 10, 1974, from Mr. 
Perkins to the Secretary of State's office indicates that Mr. 
Perkins forwarded the release by Mr. Williamson so that Mr. Perkins' 
client could use the name "Skyline Realty". One day after Mr. 
Perkins sent Attachment 4 to the Secretary of State, PCR's Articles 
of Incorporation were filed and accepted by the Secretary of State. 
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At that time it would appear that the assumed name filing for Skyline 
Realty was lost by the Secretary of State. In any event, it is 
absolutely clear that PCR's Articles of Incorporation were filed 
jointly with a document that requested the use of the name Skyline 
Realty. In addition thereto, it is absolutely clear that PCR, 
through its attorney, did all that was necessary to obtain the 
rights to the use of the name. If there was any error it would appear 
that the Secretary of State's office lost the application for the 
assumed name after it had been filed. Certainly the Secretary of 
State had some piece of paper before it when it generated the 
November 18, 1974 letter (Attachment 3 to Appendix B) relating to 
the use of the name Skyline Realty (which was found in the Park City 
Reservations, Inc. file). 
All of the information set forth above would have been 
available at the trial if appellant had complied with Rule 64 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence and had given respondents notice of the 
official documents they sought to introduce. That the surprise was 
potentially prejudicial is clear from the records of the Secretary 
of State after a more thorough search was made. PCR did in fact make 
the requisite filings and is not barred by any statute from 
maintaining this action. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that appellant was correct and in fact 
PCR did not meet the requisite standards that it must file an assumed 
name certificate with the Secretary of State's office, it does not 
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follow that PCR is barred from maintaining this action. The Trial 
Court ruled that appellant was precluded from raising a defense of 
lack of capacity by virtue of the fact that appellant waived such 
defense. 
A defense that a party has not filed an assumed name 
certificate is a "capacity" defense rather than a defense that goes 
to the merits. Union Trust Co. v. Quigley, 259 P. 28 (Wash. 1927). 
Capacity defenses under the laws of the State of Utah are governed by 
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9 specifically 
requires that when a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal 
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued 
or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative 
capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall 
include such supporting particulars as are within the pleaders' 
knowledge. A defense of lack of capacity clearly requires a 
pleading so that the opposite party can prepare to meet any claims 
that are involved. This Court has had occasion to determine whether 
or not waiver of a capacity argument would occur without such a 
pleading. In Tooele Meat and Storage Co. v. Fite Candy Co., 168 
P. 427 (Utah 1917) this Court held that an objection of the lacking 
of legal capacity was waived unless raised either by answer or by 
demurer. 
In this instance it would appear that the Trial Court properly 
applied the doctrine of waiver. (Appendix A, Conclusions of Law 
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10.) The appellant in this case had knowledge of the purported lack 
of capacity at least as of January 4, 1980. January 4, 1980 is the 
date that appellant obtained Exhibit 52 from the office of the 
Secretary of State. The trial of this case began January 14th. 
Exhibit 52 was not even introduced nor was a copy given to any of the 
respondents until January 30. There were at least 26 days during 
which the appellant could have given notice to the respondents of 
the capacity defense. However, appellant indicated that it did not 
give notice because it could not file any motion with the Court 
within 30 days as of the commencement of trial because of local Rule 
10 of the Third District Rules. That argument totally lacks merit. 
The obvious purpose of the requirement that a capacity defense be 
pleaded is to give notice to the opposing parties so that they may 
make whatever preparations are necessary. Although the appellant 
may have been precluded from filing a motion for summary judgment or 
some other motion, appellant was not precluded from giving notice to 
opposing counsel that such a defense would be raised. It would have 
been a very simple matter for appellant's counsel to lift up the 
telephone and call counsel for respondents and indicate that 
appellant intended to plead such a defense. At least respondents 
then would have had the opportunity of analyzing the facts and 
determining whether or not the defense had merit. Further, Section 
42-2-10 of the Utah Code Annotated (the section dealing with assumed 
h forth Wl. th a lawsuit "until names) provides t at a party cannot go 
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the provisions of this Chapter have been complied with." It would 
have been a very simple matter to notify the respondents so that the 
respondents could determine whether or not they had complied with 
the requirements of Title 42 relating to assumed names. As 
appellant is well aware, this matter could easily have been resolved 
by respondents in that proper filings could have been made to allow 
this case to proceed on the merits if such filings were deemed 
necessary. The only possible explanation for appellant's waiting 
until the last day of evidence is that appellant hoped to accomplish 
an ambush and cause this action to not be decided on the merits but 
upon an argument never previously raised. Such a procedure is 
wholly improper and the Trial Court correctly disallowed it. 
Appellant's only response is the contention that appellant was 
lulled into its error by virtue of a communication from counsel for 
PCR indicating that the proper party defendants ought to be PCR. 
Given the facts set forth on pages 42-46 of this brief, it is still 
the position of PCR's counsel that the proper party was PCR and not 
the individuals. However, it doesn't matter. The bottom line is 
that plaintiff's counsel waited until the last day to introduce 
evidence he had knowledge of substantially prior to the date of its 
introduction. That evidence could have been responded to by the 
defendants. That evidence went to capacity which is a defense that 
requires advance notice. Further, the defendants could have filed 
whatever papers had to be filed to allow this case to proceed on the 
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merits. Given the facts involved, it was not error for the trial 
Court to determine that appellant had waived any such defense of 
capacity if such a defense ever existed. 
Appellant's argument that defendants could have sought a Stey 
in order to respondents' counsel to go to the Secretary of State's 
office is also without merit. The burdens on the Court's calendar 
are such that the Court was not required nor were the defendants 
required to cause such a filing to occur before the action could be 
completed. Had appellant acted properly and advised respondents as 
to the proposed defense as soon as plaintiffs became aware of it, 
then all of the necessary actions could have been completed prior to 
the trial and no delay would have resulted. Given such facts it is 
entirely proper to find that any defense of lack of capacity was 
waived by virtue of the failure to bring it forth as soon as 
appellant had knowledge of the requisite facts. 
Appellant also contends that PCR was precluded from maintaini§ 
this action because it is not a registered broker with the Depart· 
ment of Business Regulations. Exhibit D. 43 is an affidavit of 
Steven J. Francis, the director of the real estate division of the 
Department of Business Regulations for the State of Utah. Mr. 
Francis indicates that at all times relevant to this action Harry F. 
Reed was a properly registered real estate broker with the State of 
Utah and was a broker/branch manager for Skyline Realty. If PCR is 
correct in its contention that in fact Skyline Realty was an assumed 
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name of PCR, or that appellant had waived its right to challenge the 
assumed name, appellant's contention must automatically fail. 
The facts with regard to the timing of the presentation of this 
defense are the same as to the assumed name defense, appellant 
waited until the trial was substantially completed and then raised 
the defense for the first time. The Trial Court ruled that if such a 
defense had once existed, it was waived. 
Even if PCR is in error as to the assumed name issue, it does 
not mean that PCR must lose because it is not a registered broker. 
One of the issues to be determined is whether or not the corporation 
itself must hold a brokerage license or whether it is adequate if the 
corporation employs a licensed broker who is the person involved in 
the transaction. Section 61-2-18 (a) reads as follows: 
" (a) No person, partnership, association or 
corporation shall bring or maintain an action 
in any court of this state for the recovery of 
commission, a fee, or compensation for any act 
done or service rendered the doing or rendering 
of which is prohibited under the provisions of 
this act to other than licensed real estate 
brokers, unless such person was duly licensed 
hereunder as a real estate broker at the time of 
the doing of such act or the rendering of such 
service." (Emphasis added.) 
The statute does not require the corporation itself hold a brokerage 
license. The statute merely prohibits a corporation as well as 
other entities from maintaining an action for the recovery of a 
commission if the person who participated in the recovery of the 
commission is not a licensed real estate broker. In this instance 
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all of the parties agree that the communications relating to the 
sale of this property were between two licensed brokers, Harry Reed 
and Hal Taylor. Harry Reed testified he was employed by Skyline 
which he understood to be an assumed name of PCR. Skyline Realty was 
listed with the Department of Business Regulations as a brokerage. 
It would be a harsh application of this statute if PCR was precluded 
from the recovery of mcr.ies that would otherwise be due and owing 
because there was no brokerage license issued in the specific name 
of PCR even though PCR' s employee was licensed as a broker. 
The legislative purpose of the statute appears to be to protect 
the public from unscrupulous and/or untrained individuals who might 
be involved in selling land in order to get commissions. In this 
case all of the public protections were met. Reed was a duly 
licensed broker and Skyline was registered with the Department of 
Business Regulations. 
Appellant has not cited to a single case which precludes the 
recovery of a commission that has facts such as these. Each case 
cited by appellant wherein the recovery of a commission was 
precluded involved a transaction wherein the people who 
participated in the transaction were not licensed brokers. In each 
and every case cited by appellant wherein the Court struck down the 
right to obtain a commission, the person who was involved in the 
transaction was not a licensed broker. There is no case cited by 
appellant analogous to this one wherein a corporation acting through 
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its employee (a licensed real estate broker) sought to obtain an 
earned commission and was refused such commission because the 
corporation itself was not licensed. In fact, this is another 
reason why the Trial Court was correct in ruling against the 
capacity defense raised by appellant. PCR believes that this Court 
is entitled to take judicial notice of the records on file with the 
Department of Business Regulations for companies who engage in real 
estate transactions. PCR has been advised that approximately one-
half of the companies do not have brokerage licenses in the name of 
the corporations but in fact maintain the licenses in the names of 
persons employed by the corporations who are brokers. Indeed, this 
Court can take judicial notice that the Department of Business 
Regulations will only grant a broker's license to a corporation if 
there is a qualified person within the corporation with whom the 
license may rest. There is no telling the amount of damage that 
might be done to real estate transactions that are currently 
occurring, have occurred, and will occur if this Court adopts the 
construction of the statute sought by appellant. At least, that 
type of evidence is something that could have been developed at 
trial had sufficient notice of the nature of the capacity defense 
been given prior to the last days of the trial. 
This Court has recently decided a case wherein the Court looked 
to the substance of the transaction and allowed a commission to be 
earned even though the party seeking the commission was not a 
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broker. In Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development 
Company, 614 P.2d 155 (Utah 1980), this Court decided that Global 
Recreation was entitled to a commission even though Global was 
neither a broker nor a licensed real estate salesman. The Court 
analyzed the facts and determined that the requirements of the 
statute were met. The Court held that one Richardson, who was a 
principal of AID, had a broker's license. AID held itself out as a 
broker based upon Richardson's license. The Court held that the 
purchasers of the Cedar Hills property were fully protected as 
contemplated by the statute because both a licensed broker and a 
licensed salesman were involved in the land sales. The Court 
further held that the purpose of Section 61-2-1 was not to protect 
real estate developers who seek relief from their own contractual 
obligations as does appellant herein. Rather, the Court held that 
the purpose of the statute was for protection of members of the 
public who rely on licensed real estate brokers and salesmen to 
perform tasks that require a high degree of honesty and integrity. 
Clearly, if AID (which was not a broker but employed a broker just as 
PCR d/b/a Skyline employed a broker) qualified the transaction under 
the statute, then Harry Reed and Hal Taylor qualify the transaction 
currently before the Court. 
At the trial PCR' s counsel made a motion to amend the pleadings 
to conform to the evidence and insert Harry Reed as a 
counterclaimant. (T. 625.) The evidence is clear that two real 
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estate brokers were involved in the transaction - Harry Reed and Hal 
Taylor. PCR's counsel moved that Harry Reed be substituted as an 
additional party on the counterclaim since he was involved with 
Taylor and was clearly a duly licensed broker. The Court took the 
motion under advisement and never made a ruling because it 
eventually ruled appellant had waived the right to make a capacity 
argument and that counterclaimant, within the meaning of the 
statute, was a duly licensed real estate broker. If appellant is 
correct and the Trial Court was wrong in its ruling, then the motion 
to substitute Harry Reed as a proper party in interest should have 
been granted. Since all of the facts are exactly identical there was 
no possible unfair prejudice to plaintiff. The people who caused 
the sale to go through, Harry Reed and Gary Cole acting on behalf of 
Park City Reservations, Inc., should not be denied a commission 
given these facts. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO AWARD DAMAGES 
TO TAYLOR FOR BREACH OF A PURPORTED FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
1. Appellant apparently relies on the following facts in 
support of its theory that PCR breached a fiduciary obligation: 
A. Reed and Cole did not investigate appellant's contractual 
relation with Stevenson when first contacted by Stevenson. 
(Appellant's Brief page 53.) 
B. Cole sent a registration letter setting forth PCR's having 
shown the property to Davis without disclosing that Unionamerica 
had "found and negotiated with Davis without the assistance of Reed 
or Cole." (Appellant's Brief page 53.) 
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C. When Reed approached Taylor to confirm that Taylor would 
split the commission on a 60/40 basis, Reed did not tell Taylor that 
Unionamerica had first encountered the buyer without the assistance 
of Reed or Cole. (Appellant's Brief page 53.) 
D. Reed lied to Taylor as to the source of the buyer in that 
Reed told Taylor that Cole had skied with the buyer. (Appellant's 
Brief page 54. ) 
Items A through C above are all predicated upon the assumption 
that Reed and/or Cole had some sort of obligation to tell Taylor that 
Unionamerica had first encountered the buyer. If the predicate is 
incorrect, then any possible fault relating to items A through C 
above are also incorrect. It is PCR' s position that Reed and Cole 
were not under the obligation Taylor is seeking to impose. The fact 
that Reed told Taylor that Cole had encountered the buyer through 
skiing does not give rise to a cause of action. Reed testified that 
when he approached Taylor to tell him they had a buyer, he was met 
with extreme hostility. At that point when Taylor asked where Reed 
had found the buyer, Reed merely stated Cole had skied with Davis. 
(T. 469.) It was apparent that Reed was trying to minimize any 
possible conflict with Taylor. (T. 468-470.) There was no 
conspiracy to hide from Taylor where the purchaser was first 
encountered. On the very same day that Reed told Taylor that Cole 
had skied with Davis, Taylor asked Stevenson if he knew where Davis 
had been found. Stevenson on that day told Taylor that he had 
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referred Davis to Cole. Although Reed made a mistake in telling 
Taylor that Cole had skied with Davis, there is no possible manner in 
which Taylor was injured by virtue of that statement. Taylor did 
absolutely nothing in reliance upon Reed's assertion. There is not 
one item of evidence in the record that Reed's statement to Taylor 
had any adverse affect upon Taylor whatsoever. There is no way 
appellant can claim such an adverse affect because Taylor learned 
immediately (on the same day) where Davis had been encountered. 
Therefore, the Trial Court was correct in refusing to award Taylor 
damages based upon Reed's statement to Taylor. 
Appellant's position that PCR breached a fiduciary obligation 
and appellant is entitled to damages must fail for several reasons: 
1. Reed and Cole were not under any duties to investigate the 
listing contract between Taylor and Unionamerica. Appellant has 
cited no case that would put one realtor under a duty to investigate 
a property owner's contractual relationship with another realtor. 
Reed and Cole were approached by Stevenson because Stevenson wanted 
their assistance to properly present the property to Davis. Because 
Stevenson had given an listing to Taylor, does not mean that 
Stevenson also agreed to refer every possible purchaser to Taylor. 
In fact, PCR is aware of no listing contract utilized in Park City 
nor in any other area that would require such a result. Since there 
was no reason for Reed or Cole to anticipate that Stevenson had some 
sort of special deal with Taylor that would require Stevenson to 
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send the purchaser to Taylor, then there was no reason to explore the 
contractual relationship between Stevenson and Taylor before 
discussing the property with Davis. 
2. Even if appellant were correct that Reed and Cole had the 
duty to determine the underlying contractual obligation between 
Taylor and Unionamerica before accepting the referral, there is no 
possible manner in which appellant can demonstrate harm. Neither 
the listing agreement nor the settlement agreement (Exhibits 2 and 
3) require walk-ins to be referred to Taylor. Had Reed and Cole 
understood the entire underlying transaction between Taylor and 
Unionamerica, it would not have changed the result whatsoever. Reed 
and Cole were entitled to accept the referrals from Unionamerica 
because there was nothing in the contract that precluded 
Unionamerica from sending the prospective purchaser to a realtor 
other than Taylor. Therefore, had Reed and Cole advised Taylor as to 
everything prior to accepting the referral, they would have still 
been entitled to accept such referral. 
3. Appellant is in error in contending that Harry Reed is a 
sub-agent under appellant and therefore owes appellant a fiduciary 
obligation. The law relating to whether a selling broker is an agent 
of the owner or of the listing broker is far from clear. It is 
obvious the selling broker performs functions for both the buyer and 
the seller. What the selling broker is called appears to be a 
function of the facts. In Frisell v. Newman, 429 P.2d 864 (Wash. 
-58-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1967), the court faced a situation where the selling broker had 
possibly participated in material ommissions which hurt the owner. 
In that situation, the court determined that the selling broker 
should be called a sub-agent of the owner in order that the selling 
broker was put under a duty to let the owner know of facts and 
circumstances within the selling broker's knowledge. In this case 
there is no possible claim that PCR, Reed or Cole violated any 
fiduciary obligation to the owner. The owner was fully informed of 
the facts at all times. 
In Pumphrey v. Quillen, 141 N.E. 2d 675 (Ohio App. 1955) the 
Ohio appellate court determined that a selling realtor was not ever 
an agent of the owner in a situation where the selling real estate 
agent had apparently misled the purchaser. The court held that the 
only relationship between the selling broker and the owner was the 
multiple listing group and that when the owner signed a contract of 
sale they had no knowledge of any misrepresentation made by the 
selling broker. 
The fact that courts have characterized the relationships 
between owners, listing realtors, and selling realtors in several 
different manners demonstrates there is no one universal rule. (See 
71 ALR 3rd 586 for an article analyzing different courts that have 
found real estate arrangements to constitute partnerships, joint 
ventures, agency contracts, and employment contracts. Numerous 
cases are cited wherein none of the relationships were found to 
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exist·) It is clear that an analysis of the case law leads to the 
proposition that the courts do not universally support the 
proposition that a selling broker is always a sub-agent of the 
listing broker. The facts of each case would have to be analyzed to 
determine how the relationships ought to be characterized. In this 
action it is apparent that for some purposes Skyline was an agent of 
the purchaser as well .:.::; an agent of the seller. Skyline may even 
have been a third party beneficiary to a contract between the 
listing broker and the owner in that Exhibit 2 provided that any 
selling broker would be entitled to 60% of the commission. In any 
event, given the facts of this case it would not be a fair 
characterization to conclude that Skyline was just Taylor's agent. 
4. The Trial Court was correct in not granting any damages 
because there was no damage evidence introduced which rationally 
relates to this cause of action. Even if a fiduciary relationship 
existed between Taylor and Reed, there was no evidence presented how 
Taylor was damaged by virtue of the breach of the fiduciary 
obligation. The Trial Court determined that Unionamerica was 
entitled to refer and Skyline was entitled to accept a walk-in from 
an outside source. Since the parties were entitled to do what they 
did, it is very difficult to understand appellant's damage theory. 
Appellant appears to merely be saying that since PCR did not tell 
appellant everything it knew about the transaction, PCR ought not to 
be entitled to receive any commission. Appellant was under a duty to 
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show damages if in fact fiduciary obligations were breached and 
explain to the Trial Court in a rational manner the relationship 
between the breach of the fiduciary duty and the damages sought. 
That was never done because the facts simply do not support 
appellant's position. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
PCR will not repeat the arguments made by Unionamerica with 
regard to punitive damages. PCR believes that Unionamerica' s 
position is correct and in order to avoid repetition will not 
restate the argument set forth therein. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, these respondents 
respectfully request that the Court deny the relief sought by 
appellant and affirm the Trial Court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .1.Q_ day of April, 1981. 
MARTINEAU, ROOKER, LARSEN & KIMBALL 
s~c~c~ 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents Park City Reservations, 
Inc., dba Skyline Realty, Harry F. 
Reed, and Gary Cole 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of April, 1981, I 
served two copies of Defendants-Respondents, Park City Reservation 
Inc., dba Skyline Realty, Harry F. Reed, and Gary Cole's Brief 
upon Kent B. Linebaugh, Esq. of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn 
at 370 East South Temple, Suite 401, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and F. S. Prince, Jr., Esq. and James A. Boevers, Esq., of 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, at Third Floor Many Plaza, 424 East 
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